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Résumé:  
Cet article porte sur les entrées de capitaux spéculatifs en Chine. Le système financier chinois 
se libéralise progressivement et l efficacité des contrôles des capitaux a tendance à diminuer. 
Ainsi, l économie chinoise fait face à des entrées de capitaux spéculatifs. La forte baisse du 
taux d intérêt US amorcée en 2001 et les anticipations portant sur l ajustement du système de 
change chinois représentent les principaux facteurs expliquant ces entrées de capitaux 
spéculatifs. Cet article adapte le modèle de Bernanke et Blinder (1988) à une économie 
ouverte afin d analyser les implications sur l économie chinoise des entrées de capitaux 
spéculatifs. Un modèle à correction d erreur sur données mensuelles (mars 1995-mars 2005) 
est estimé pour évaluer l impact de l accroissement des réserves de changes résultant des 
entrées de capitaux spéculatifs. Les interactions entre le crédit domestique et les réserves de 
change apparaissent stables et compatibles avec la stabilité monétaire. Des tests de causalité 
directe et indirecte à la Granger sont également mis en uvre afin d expliciter comment la 
banque centrale chinoise est parvenue à maintenir la stabilité monétaire.  
Classification JEL: C32, E5, F32, F33 
Mots-clés: capitaux spéculatifs, crédit domestique, VECM, causalité à la Granger   
Abstract:   
This paper investigates hot money inflows in China. The financial liberalization comes into 
effect and the effectiveness of capital controls tends to diminish over time. As a result, China 
is fuelled by hot money inflows. The US interest rate cut since 2001 and expectations of 
exchange rate adjustments are the main factors explaining these capital inflows. This study 
uses the Bernanke and Blinder (1988) model extended to an open economy to examine 
implications of hot money inflows for the Chinese economy. A Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM) on monthly data from March 1995 to March 2005 is estimated to investigate 
the recent upsurge in foreign reserves and shows that the interaction between domestic credit 
and foreign reserves was stable and consistent with monetary stability. Granger causality tests 
are implemented to show how the People s Bank of China (PBC) achieved this result.  
JEL classification: C32, E5, F32, F33 
Keywords: hot money inflows, domestic credit, VECM, Granger causality 
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I. Introduction  
The 1997-98 financial crises in Asia have been widely documented. Twin crises models, 
putting the emphasis on balance sheet approaches (Jeanne and Zettelmeyer, 2002), enlighten 
the stylized facts related to this crisis. In these models, the private sector builds up hot money 
and a reversal in creditor perceptions leads to a sudden stop (Dornbusch et al., 1995) with 
large deleterious effects on the economy. Consequently, most countries affected by the Asian 
crisis switched to managed float systems and tried to implement prudential regulation in order 
to deal with new financial and monetary imbalances. However, this strategy has not been able 
to cut hot money inflows sufficiently. Both financial development levels (Aghion et al., 2004) 
and the original sin theory (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999) emphasize this issue. As a 
result, complementary actions are needed to avoid the occurrence of new imbalances. For 
example, Thailand has been applying capital controls on inflows since September 2003 (Bank 
of Thailand, 2003a-b) to offset the negative effects of its weak financial development whereas 
Korea cares about exchange rate fluctuations when setting its monetary policy (Eichengreen, 
2004a).        
The gradual financial liberalization in China provides interesting insight into this issue. This 
strategy prevented the accumulation of foreign-currency-denominated liabilities in the private 
sector. Consequently, China did not accumulate hot money in the 1990 s and recorded a 
strong growth during the Asian crisis (Fernald and Babson, 1999). However, the financial 
liberalization in China is progressing. First, banking reforms highlight the transformation of 
the Chinese economy from a centrally planned economy to a market-based economy. Second, 
capital controls became less effective and cannot provide a long lasting protection anymore if 
incentives for capital inflows linger. Hence, hot money inflows can fuel the Chinese financial 
system.  
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In particular, Prasad and Wei (2005) show that non-FDI capital inflows are significantly 
increasing in China since 2001. They are mainly explained by the interest rate differential 
between China and the United States (US), coupled with expectations of a renminbi (RMB) 
revaluation. These hot money inflows could question the suitability of the currency peg. The 
People s Bank of China (PBC) has to intervene in the foreign exchange market to face hot 
money inflows which increase the pace of reserves accumulation. If these capital inflows are 
not fully sterilized, they lead to liquidity injections into the economy. The recent move (July 
2005) toward more exchange rate flexibility is therefore appropriate to keep domestic 
monetary conditions under control and to stabilize the domestic banking sector.  
The purpose of this paper is to identify hot money inflows in China and to consider their 
implications in the Chinese economy. More precisely, we investigate if the rise in foreign 
reserves was a source of monetary instability3 or if the PBC succeeded in keeping domestic 
monetary conditions under control. Indeed, Chinese authorities delayed for a long time the 
move toward more exchange rate flexibility. In addition, the initial move in July 2005 only 
means the beginning of a gradual process toward a free float. Thus, hot money inflows during 
this transition period could strengthen the rapid growth of bank credit which, in turn, could 
lead to an overheating situation and could complicate domestic monetary management. 
The implications of hot money inflows for the Chinese economy are investigated with the 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) model extended to an open economy. Furthermore, a VECM, 
draws on the theoretical model, is estimated to examine the monetary instability which could 
result from the increase in foreign reserves. The empirical estimations use monthly data from 
March 1995 to March 2005 and show that the interaction between domestic credit and foreign 
reserves was stable and consistent with monetary stability. Finally, the sterilization policy 
applied by the PBC to manage these capital inflows is investigated with Granger causality 
                                                
3
 Money supply is considered as endogenous and made up of domestic credit and international reserves. The 
monetary stability that we investigate is therefore mainly linked to the evolution of domestic credit. 
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tests. Empirical results show that reserve requirements on top of open market operations 
did not drain all the liquidity. Consequently, hot money inflows lead to monetary expansion. 
Nevertheless, we also show that the PBC succeeded to shape domestic credit using window 
guidance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews banking 
reforms and identifies hot money inflows resulting from the financial liberalization. Section 
III presents the stylized framework. Section IV discusses the empirical results. Section V 
concludes.  
I. Financial liberalization in China   
The financial liberalization of the Chinese economy is progressing which emphasize its 
transition to a market economy. In particular, the banking system obtained greater decision-
making autonomy and capital controls have become less effective over time.  
1. The banking sector 
Allen et al. (2003, 2005a, 2005b) investigate China s financial system and its ability to 
support the economic growth, which provides a precise insight into financing channels in 
China.  
The Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange were respectively created in 
1990 and 1991 and some selected firms from Mainland China can henceforth be listed and 
traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. These markets have been growing fast but the 
market-based channel of financing is still an inefficient way to raise funds in China. The 
underdeveloped legal system explains this situation which is consistent with the law-finance-
growth literature notably developed by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998). 
 6
The financial system is therefore dominated by a large banking sector characterized by a high 
ratio of total bank credit to GDP (111%). However, the efficiency of this banking sector is 
low with an overhead cost to total assets (12%) much higher than the ones estimated by La 
Porta et al. (1997, 1998) on other banking sectors (between 2% and 5%). Credit allocation 
also varies across sectors. Most bank credits are granted to the State Sector4 and the Listed 
Sector, the ratio of bank credit issued to the Private Sector to GDP is only 24%. Moreover, 
Allen et al. (2003, 2005a, 2005b) show that the Private Sector grows much faster than the two 
other sectors which suggests that the Chinese financial system is also characterized by 
alternative financing channels. 
However, this result must not lead to underestimate the role of bank credit in the Chinese 
macroeconomic situation (Hu, 2003). The financial liberalization especially in the banking 
sector has been essential in the Chinese transition to a market economy and the review of 
these reforms (Mo, 1999; Wong and Wong, 2001; Barth et al., 2004; Barnett, 2004) highlights 
the deep modifications that occurred in the banking sector.    
Prior to 1978, the banking sector was only made up of the PBC which acted as both the 
central bank and a commercial bank. The year 1978 marked therefore the inception of 
banking reforms. The PBC was established as China s central bank while commercial bank 
activities were mainly assigned to three specialized state-owned banks: the Bank of China, the 
People s Construction Bank of China and the Agriculture Bank of China. In 1984, the fourth 
state-owned commercial bank (the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China) and some non-
state owned bank expanded the banking sector while the sectoral specialization barriers were 
reduced. The central bank status and the scope of business for commercial banks were 
clarified afterwards in 1995 with the Central Bank Law and The Commercial Banking Law 
allowing the implementation of a legal framework based on international standards. 
                                                
4
 Allen et al (2005b) define the State Sector as state-owned enterprises (SOE), the Listed Sector as firms that are 
listed on an exchange and are publicly traded, and the Private Sector as all the other firms.  
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The credit plan was abolished at end-1997 but its effectiveness and its scope were decreasing 
before this official abolition. The banking sector expansion and an increasingly market-driven 
economy explain that the credit plan became less effective over time (Montes-Negret, 1995; 
Mo, 1999). In particular, three policy lending banks were established in 1994 (the State 
Development Bank, the China Export-Import Bank and the China Agricultural Development 
Bank) to implement the government-directed policy lending. Pressures from central and local 
governments on state-owned banks were therefore reduced.  
Over the recent period, China s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 became a 
driving force in the deregulation process since this agreement commits China to completely 
open its financial-services industry to foreigners in December 2006 (Woo, 2002).  
All these reforms have been leading to a greater decision-making autonomy of the banking 
sector and ensure the foundation of a competitive, modern banking system. Chen et al. (2005) 
show that the overall efficiency of Chinese banks significantly increased from the early 1990s 
until 1996. This result is mainly due to the 1995 reform program. Decisions are more profit-
oriented and thus more based on creditworthiness, which represents a significant progress to 
deal with future flows of problem loans. However, Chen et al. (2005) also show that the 
efficiency of Chinese banks gradually fell from 1997 to 2000, especially as a result of an 
increase in state-owned enterprises (SOE) non-performing loans. Reforms on deregulation 
will not solve the stock problem of non performing loans resulting from the financing of loss-
making SOE during the credit plan. Equity injections (like the ones of $32.5 billion in August 
1998 and $45 billion in December 2003) and the creation of Asset Management Corporations 
(AMC) are the two orientations followed by the central bank to solve this structural problem 
(Mo, 1999; Ma and Fung, 2002).      
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2. Hot money inflows in China 
The RMB has been convertible for current account transactions since 1996, but capital 
account transactions are still under control (Xiaopu, 2003): portfolio investments are 
constrained, foreign direct investments (FDI) are oriented and short term capital inflows are 
forbidden.  Nevertheless, the People s Republic of China (PRC) is not fully isolated from hot 
money inflows. Capital controls are not applied to each category of capital account 
transactions  several are free or loosely managed (Xie, 2004)5.  
The balance of payments roughly records the amount of hot money inflows (Tung and Baker, 
2004; Rzepkowski, 2004; Prasad and Wei, 2005). First, significant portfolio investments 
inflows are recorded in the capital account. During the second half of 2003 and the first half 
of 2004, net portfolio investments inflows were respectively $15.7 and $27.7 billions (Table 
1). Second, Chinese banks and depositors manage foreign assets. These transactions are 
recorded in the sub-section Other investments in the financial account but official figures 
can be misleading. In December 2003, the PBC used $45 billion of its exchange reserves in 
order to recapitalize two state commercial banks. This operation was recorded in the sub-
section Other investments and the funds were allocated to a holding company owned by the 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). As a result Other investments inflows 
represented in fact $39.1 billions in 2003 and were mainly explained by the behavior of 
Chinese banks and depositors. Lastly some capital inflows escape to regulatory controls but 
they are all the same recorded in the balance of payments in the statistical discrepancy. 
Indeed, in 2003, errors and omissions increased significantly6 and have represented $18.4 
billions which contrast with illegal capital outflows noticed during the 1990 s (Gunter, 2004).  
                                                
5 Prasad and Wei (2005) provide an extensive chronology of capital controls over the period 1980 - January 
2005. 
6 The evolution of the errors and omissions category may also in part reflect an accounting issue related to 
changes in the dollar value of foreign asset (Prasad and Wei, 2005). 
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According to Andy Xie economist at Morgan Stanley the hot money is mainly held by 
overseas Chinese (Chinese diaspora, mainly from Taiwan), Chinese banks converting their 
foreign assets into RMB assets while Chinese households stop accumulating foreign deposits. 
These hot money inflows are estimated at 70 billions dollars in 2003 and 30 billions dollars 
during the first half of 2004 (Table 1). Hence, the rapid increase in international reserves of 
China offset mainly non-FDI capital inflows rather than trade surplus.  
US interest rate fluctuations could be the main factor explaining hot money inflows. Figure 1 
shows that the foreign reserves upsurge started with the US interest rate cut in 2001 whereas 
the Chinese interest rate has been roughly stable. The interest rate differential between China 
and the US is linked to capital controls applied by the PBC but Cheung et al. (2003) also 
highlight an increasing financial integration between the PRC and the US. Thus, the PBC has 
to consider international issues as the financial liberalization comes into effect.  
In addition, exchange rate expectations could constitute a second important factor explaining 
hot money inflows. The PBC applied up to July 2005 a fixed exchange rate against the US 
dollar but speculation around the RMB appreciation has been going up according to the dollar 
general weakness and the commercial imbalance between the US and China. The offshore 
interest rate implied by the markets for non-deliverable forwards (NDF) in Asian currency 
underlines this issue (Ma et al., 2004; Fung et al., 2004).  
The interest rate differential and the exchange rate expectations have specially affected the 
evolution of Chinese foreign currency deposits (Ma and McCauley, 2002, 2003). Foreign 
currency deposit in proportion to RMB deposit held by households and firms are decreasing 
since 2002 (Rzepkowski, 2004).   
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III. Theoretical design   
We consider the Bernanke and Blinder (1988) model extended to an open economy. This 
model was also developed by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990) and includes a financial 
accelerator mechanism.  
1. Asset markets equilibrium: the AA schedule  
The AA schedule simultaneously refers to the money market and the foreign exchange market 
as the asset markets. The equilibrium condition in the money market is provided by the LM 
curve. The money demand results from a transaction motive and a speculative motive whereas 
the money supply is endogenous and made up of domestic credit and international reserves: 
tt
t
tt iyL
P
DCIR
, ,       (1) 
where tP is the price level, tIR the international reserves, tDC the domestic credit, .L the 
money demand function, ty  the output and ti the real interest rate on bonds.  
The equilibrium condition in the foreign exchange market is provided by the interest parity 
relation (IP). The expected appreciation of the dollar equals zero since China applied a fixed 
exchange rate regime with the US dollar during the considered period. The domestic interest 
rate can therefore be written as the sum of the US interest rate plus the risk premium: 
ttt ii
*
,         (2) 
where *ti  is the US real interest rate on bonds and t  the risk premium.  
The AA schedule, combining the LM curve and the interest parity, is defined by the following 
equation:  
ttt
t
tt iyL
P
DCIR *
, .          (3) 
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This schedule provides therefore a nice insight into interactions between the monetary market 
and the exchange market which is relevant for the paper.  
2. Output market equilibrium: the CC schedule 
The CC schedule refers to the goods and services market (G&S) and the equilibrium 
condition is provided by the equality between an aggregate demand function and the 
aggregate supply. Furthermore, we consider the specificities of loans which are imperfectly 
substitutable for bonds to stress their importance on aggregate demand. Following Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981), the loan market is characterized by the following assumptions. First, 
lenders are unable to distinguish among borrowers because of informational asymmetries. 
Second, borrowers accept a common fixed loan size. Third, as interest rate on loans rises, the 
quality of borrower pools falls. Finally, banks are assumed to be risk averse and characterized 
by declining absolute risk aversion as their financial positions improve. These assumptions 
underline adverse selection and incentive effect resulting from asymmetric information faced 
by banks about borrowers. As a result, the loan market equilibrium can be characterized by 
credit rationing. 
Besides, we assume simplified commercial bank balance sheets where liabilities consist of 
deposits and bank capital while their assets consist of required reserves, excess reserves, loans 
and bonds. Drawing on Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990), the 
bank lending level is therefore specified by the following relation: 
11 ,t t t t tDC D i y ,       (4) 
where tD are the deposits, tD the required reserves plus the excess reserves, t the bank 
capital, ty the output gap and 0 1 the fraction of bank assets loaned with 0i and 
0y
7
. The risk-averse banks are therefore less willing to invest in loans when the rate of 
                                                
7 
j  is the partial derivative with respect to variable j. 
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return on the less risky government bonds is high. Further, the financial position of firms is 
related to the output gap. An economic slowdown deteriorates therefore the overall quality of 
the borrowing pool which reduces the willing of commercial banks to supply credit.  
In order to specify the total deposit amount, we assume a simplified central bank balance 
sheet where the asset consists of net foreign asset (NFA) and net domestic asset (NDA) and 
where the liability consists of the monetary base (high-powered money) made of banks 
reserves (claims on PBC) and currency in circulation. As a result, according to the money 
multiplier theory, deposits are given by the following relation: 
t
t
BD ,          (5) 
where tB is the monetary base, the reserve requirement plus the excess reserve-demand 
deposit ratio and the currency-demand deposit ratio. 
The contractual interest rate in the credit rationing equilibrium is given by: 
,t t tr i y ,          (6) 
where tr  is the interest rate on loans, 0i  and y  may be either positive or negative
8
. 
The credit demand can correspond to a smaller amount than that available as a result of the 
bank portfolio decisions. There is therefore no credit rationing in such a situation and 
competition among banks will drive down the interest rate on loans.  
The financial liberalization in China makes appropriate this specification of the banking 
sector. Banks were simply allowed to adjust lending interest rates around the administrative 
rate but the discretionary bands were gradually enlarged during the 1990 s (Xie, 2004) and 
since the second half of 2003, the ceiling on most commercial lending rates have been 
removed. Moreover lending decisions became more prudent and based on creditworthiness. 
For example, only 80% of the credit quota was fulfilled in 1997 since banks refused to lend to 
                                                
8 See Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990). A modification in the financial position of firms affects both the loan return 
frontier and the slope of the efficient frontier. 
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loss-making SOE (Mo, 1999). The banking sector obtained therefore a greater decision-
making autonomy in the credit allocation between firms. 
The equilibrium condition in the G&S market is therefore provided by the CC curve including 
a financial accelerator: 
ttttt qDCriYy ,,, ,        (7) 
where tq  is the real effective exchange rate and .Y  is  the aggregate demand function.  
Financial market conditions do not just depend on the interest rate on bonds. They also 
depend on the loan market conditions, which are both relevant to the loan rate and the credit 
supply. 
3. The build-up of monetary instabilities   
Figure 1 shows that the US interest rate (LIBOR 3 month) was cut from 6.7% end-2000 to 
1.1% during the first quarter of 2004. Such an external shock affects the equilibrium of the 
model. 
Without any intervention by the PBC, the US interest rate cut should produce an appreciation 
of the RMB according to the AA schedule. Indeed, capital inflows in China are boosted 
following the modification of the interest rate differential. Consequently, the PBC has to 
intervene in the foreign exchange market in order to keep the exchange rate stable, which 
increases its foreign reserves. The central bank balance sheet shows that the monetary base is 
related to net foreign assets. Consequently, hot money inflows lead to a monetary base 
expansion. 
It will have a positive impact on the CC schedule through the financial accelerator 
mechanism. Banks get more resources which positively affect the growth of output, monetary 
aggregates and domestic credit. As a result, this loose monetary condition has a direct impact 
on aggregate demand and can lead to an overheating situation. Besides, a sudden reversal of 
hot money flows could stop monetary creation. This liquidity squeeze might strengthen 
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balance sheet pressures and commercial banks might face up to non performing loans. The 
economy might therefore have to deal with a hard landing scenario. 
Monetary authorities can implement sterilization measures in the narrow sense9 (open market 
operations) as well as in the broader sense (with reserve requirement ratio and window 
guidance) to manage the impact of hot money inflows on the growth of monetary aggregates 
and domestic credit. However, these measures do not reduce incentives for hot money inflows 
by keeping the level of domestic interest rates high (Takagi and Esaka, 1999).  
Prasad et al. (2005) argue that China should move toward greater exchange rate flexibility to 
deal with domestic and external shocks and that capital account liberalization should be 
implemented cautiously and gradually, given weaknesses in the domestic financial system. 
The effective path toward greater exchange rate flexibility could be provided by a two-stage 
currency reform , including a revaluation of the renminbi (roughly 15%) followed by a switch 
to a currency basket peg with a gradually widening band (Goldstein and Lardy, 2003; Tung 
and Baker, 2004).   
IV. Empirical results  
A VECM, drawn on the variables highlighted in the asset markets equilibrium condition, is 
estimated using monthly data from March 1995 to March 2005 to investigate the stability of 
monetary conditions. We therefore examine if the foreign reserves increase created monetary 
instability, or if the PBC succeeded in managing hot money inflows and in keeping domestic 
credit under control.   
                                                
9 The full sterilization by open market operations requires deep local financial markets which is not the case in 
China. 
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1. Asset markets equilibrium 
1.1 Data and cointegration analysis 
Dependent variables10 are gross international reserves (IR), domestic credits (DC), GDP (y), 
consumer prices (P) and US real interest rate ( *i ). Real effective exchange rate (REER) and 
bank s reserves (BR) are considered as exogenous variables in order to take into account 
impacts from the demand side. The Chow and Lin (1971) method11 is used to obtain the GDP 
monthly estimate. We use the log transformation of index variable (October 1993=100) for all 
variables except US real interest rate (see the data appendix for the data sources).  
The original data on domestic credit and international reserves are modified. First, the $45 
billions used to recapitalize two national banks are added to international reserves in order to 
have a good specification of hot money inflows. Second, data on domestic credit showed a 
strong break in January 2002 corresponding to a 13% growth rate whereas it was around 1% 
during the previous months. We therefore consider a 1% growth rate in January 200212.      
Table 2a reports the unit root tests both in level and first difference using Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF), Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock (DF-GLS), Phillips-Perron (PP) and Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests. We conclude that domestic credit, GDP, US real interest 
rate, real exchange rate and bank s reserves are non-stationary in level but stationary in first-
difference. These variables are therefore considered as I(1) variables. Besides, we conclude 
that gross international reserves and consumer prices are non-stationary both in level and first 
difference but stationary in second difference. These variables are therefore considered as I(2) 
variables. These statistical properties highlight that the inflation rate and the growth rate of 
                                                
10 A better fit with the theoretical model should also take into account the risk premium and exchange rate 
expectations but we do not have any appropriate variable to represent these two concepts and we have also to 
care about the scope of the empirical model.   
11 This method allows to obtain the best linear unbiased estimates of a monthly series by regression on related 
series. We use the industrial production index (IPI) as related series.  
12 These two modifications allow to get residual normality without the introduction of dummy variables. 
Moreover these two shocks would have introduced an isolated instability in the long term relation linked to 
accounting procedures. 
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gross international reserves were not stationary. This outcome could have been expected with 
Figure 1 and sums up the point of the paper: Did this I(1) growth rate in foreign reserves lead 
to monetary instability or did the PBC succeed to manage hot money inflows and keep 
domestic credit under control? 
To deal with the I(2) propriety of consumer prices, we use in our estimations the real domestic 
credit, the real US interest rate and real bank s reserves whereas the GDP is at constant prices. 
We can conclude that all these series are I(1) process. 
The model therefore consists of the following equations: 
1 1
1
k
t i t i t t t
i
Y Y X Y ,       (8)      
where *t t t t t tY IR P GDP i DC and ttt BRREERX are random 
vectors, is a 5x1 constant vector and the error vector t is such that 0tE , 
0t sE  if t s and t sE  if t s with det 0 . 
The model is estimated with two lags in order to achieve normality (Jarque-Bera test) and 
independence (LM test) of residuals.  
The Johansen and Juselius (1990) cointegration method is followed. This method allows to 
test for the number of cointegrating vectors using a trace test. Nevertheless, this test could 
lead to an over rejection of the no cointegration hypothesis if we do not check the 
cointegrating rank constancy and if we do not deal with the possible finite sample bias. We 
therefore implement forward and backward recursive trace tests to investigate the 
cointegrating rank stability. Furthermore, we correct the trace test statistic for the finite 
sample bias as suggested by Reinsel and Ahn (1992) and Reimers (1991). This correction 
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does not consist in estimating new critical values but in multiplying the trace test statistic by 
the scale factor13: ( )T pk T .  
The recursive14 trace tests with the finite sample bias correction (Figure 2) support the 
existence of one cointegrating vector. Although the second cointegrating vector is significant 
for the whole sample at 1% level with the corrected trace test, this relation is not significant 
before June 2002 with the forward recursive trace test (Figure 2a). Moreover, the backward 
recursive trace test checking the cointegrating rank constancy in the baseline sample 
strongly support the existence of only one cointegrating vector. In Figure 2b, the corrected 
trace statistic for two cointegrating relations is above the 1% critical value only when we 
consider the whole sample. 
1.2 Estimated cointegrating vectors   
Table 3 displays cointegrating vectors ( )i and adjustment coefficients ( )i . The first 
estimation 1 1( , ) only considers the homogeneity constraint between international reserves 
and consumer prices. The LR test shows that the homogeneity restriction is not rejected at the 
5% level. Besides, the LR test does not support the nullity of other coefficients. As expected, 
international reserves exhibit in the long-run a positive relationship with GDP and negative 
ones with domestic credit and US interest rate. We also check that the equilibrium error is a 
stationary process. 
The second estimation 2 2( , ) tests on top of homogeneity for the weak exogeneity of 
consumer prices, domestic credit, GDP and US interest rate. The LR test shows that these 
restrictions are not rejected at the 5% level. The adjustment coefficient is therefore only 
significant on international reserves. This coefficient is consistent with equilibrium correction 
behavior, and exhibits a strong level feedback. Adjustment forces pull the process back 
                                                
13
 With T the number of observations, p the number of endogenous variables and k the lag number. 
14 All the recursive procedures have to be cautiously considered. The range of the initial sub-samples is small.   
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toward the steady state in 1.3 periods. This outcome is consistent with the fixed exchange rate 
system applied by the PBC.  
The third estimation 3 3( , ) directly considers real international reserves. This estimation 
allows to remove an equation from the VECM and then to reduce the ratio between the 
number of estimated coefficients and the number of observations from 58% to 40%. The 
cointegrating vector is robust to this modification.  
Finally, the estimations 4 4( , ) and 5 5( , ) investigate if bank s reserves should be 
introduced in the cointegrating relation. Indeed, hot money inflows fuel bank s reserves which 
are related to domestic credit. The estimation 4 4( , ) simply introduces bank s reserves in 
the cointegrating vector and shows that the former relation is quite robust to this modification. 
The estimation 5 5( , ) enlightens this outcome. The LR test supports the nullity of the 
coefficient associated with bank s reserves. Hence, we conclude that bank s reserves do not 
have to be introduced in the cointegrating vector.  
The long run relation 2 2( , ) is now recursively estimated in order to investigate its 
constancy. The long term coefficients associated to domestic credit, GDP and US interest rate 
are quite stable (Figure 3), although a transitory instability can all the same be pointed on 
coefficients associated with domestic credit and GDP. During the third quarter of 2004, their 
two times standard error bands intersect with the horizontal axis. This analysis has to be 
completed with a recursive LR test. Indeed, several restrictions were made in order to obtain 
the  estimation 2 2( , ) . Figure 4 shows that these restrictions are recursively supported at the 
1% level. We therefore conclude that the long term structure of the estimated model, i.e. the 
asset markets equilibrium condition, was stable. As a result, the PBC succeeded in managing 
hot money inflows and in keeping domestic credit under control.  
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1.3 Impulse responses 
Impulse responses are used to analyze the dynamic interactions between variables and more 
precisely between foreign reserves and domestic credits in the system characterized by the 
cointegrating relation 3 3( , ) . First, we implement a system Sequential Estimation of 
Regressors (SER) procedure in order to test restrictions for the short run parameters15. This 
strategy allows to fit a subset model removing insignificant coefficients.   
The reduced-form residuals of this system are found to be instantaneously uncorrelated. We 
can therefore conclude to the absence of any instantaneous causality between variables and 
we can implement forecast error impulse responses.  
We compute Hall s studentized confident intervals16 based on 2000 bootstrap replications and 
50 replications for estimating the variance in each of the outer replication rounds. Standard 
and Hall confident intervals based on 2000 bootstrap replications give similar results but they 
are not displayed on Figure 5 for clarity. We also use these three methods to compute 
confident intervals based only on 1000 bootstrap replications. Similar results are obtained 
which confirm the robustness of the confident intervals displayed on Figure 5.  
We observe that both international reserves and domestic credits react negatively and 
permanently to a one-time impulse in the US interest rate residual (Figure 5a-c). The US 
interest rate cut initiated in 2001 explains therefore a part of hot money inflows, leading 
simultaneously to a credit expansion. Nevertheless, figure 5d-g shows that the PBC succeeded 
in keeping monetary expansion under control. Domestic credits react negatively to a one-time 
impulse in international reserves residual and vice-versa, international reserves react 
negatively to a one-time impulse in domestic credit residuals.  
                                                
15
 The system SER procedure checks the parameter with the smallest t-ratio in each step. The elimination of this 
parameter is based on the AIC criteria. 
16
 We use JMulTi 4.02 (Lütkepohl and Krätzig, 2004). 
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We note that the response of international reserves to its own impulse (Figure 5d) is not 
permanent. This outcome results from the fixed exchange rate system applied by the PBC and 
was highlighted in Table 3 by the strong adjustment force on international reserves. In 
addition, the extent of permanent responses of international reserves to impulses in domestic 
credits and US interest rate is related to coefficients estimated in the cointegrating vector 
3 3( , ) . Responses of international reserves are -0.1862 and -0.0076 following respectively a 
1.5675 increase in domestic credits and a 0.8627 increase in US interest rate which 
approximately give back the estimated relationships respectively of 0.1221 and 0.0089 (Table 
3). 
We therefore conclude that hot money inflows did not cause instability in domestic monetary 
conditions. The estimated cointegrating relations and impulse responses show that the 
interaction between domestic credit and foreign reserves was stable and consistent with 
monetary stability. We can now examine how the PBC proceeded to get this result. 
2. The management of hot money inflows  
2.1 The sterilization policy 
Hot money inflows lead the central bank to accumulate foreign reserves in a fixed exchange 
rate system. As a result, net foreign assets (NFA) in the central bank balance sheet expand. 
Open market operations, reserve requirements and window guidance are the main instruments 
used by policymakers to manage consequences of these capital inflows on the domestic 
monetary sector17. 
The PBC used open market operations to sterilize hot money inflows. Central bank bills rather 
than treasury bonds have been issued insofar as treasury bonds were managed to drive the 
money market interest rate (Xie, 2004; Green, 2005). Central bank bills are recorded as net 
                                                
17 Monetary authorities can also directly influence demand and supply in the foreign exchange market in order to 
manage of hot money inflows. Lu (2004) examines measures taken by Chinese authorities to ease appreciation 
pressures on the RMB. Nevertheless, the liberalization of capital outflows could be counterproductive since this 
could stimulate further inflows (Prasad et al., 2005).   
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other assets (NOA) in the central bank balance sheet (Hu, 2003). We can therefore investigate 
to which extent the PBC used these open market operations to manage the monetary base 
(MB) growth. Figure 6 shows year on year variations in components of the central bank 
balance sheet. Since 2003, the PBC widely has used central bank bills to slow down the 
monetary base expansion but this only partially offsets the international reserves build-up. 
From end-2000 to end-2003, Higgins and Klitgaard (2004) estimate that roughly half of NFA 
increase was sterilized by open market operations.  
We can therefore compute an indicator of net foreign assets non sterilized by open market 
operations (NFOA=NFA+NOA). This indicator has a direct impact on monetary base but not 
necessary on monetary aggregates and domestic credit. Indeed, the PBC can use reserve 
requirements and window guidance to complete the sterilization process in a broader sense. 
Between the second half of 2003 and April 2004, the PBC raised banks reserve requirements 
ratio from 6% to 7.5%. The PBC sought in this way to reduce the money multiplier in order to 
drain liquidity. Furthermore, the PBC implemented window guidance to curb new lending 
(Hagiwara, 2004; Green, 2005). The PBC directly intervened in the lending of specific banks 
to specific sectors. Since the four biggest banks accounting for 69% of total bank deposits 
and 72% of total bank loans are state-owned banks, bank instructions were efficient (Hu, 
2003).  
2.2 Direct causality tests 
The management of hot money inflows by the PBC is investigated with Granger causality 
tests on vector autoregressive (VAR) models. This specification without explicit theoretical 
ground is appropriate insofar as the PBC widely used, in a discretionary way, its control on 
the banking sector. The state-owned banks were used as sterilization bonds buyers and they 
were also used to implement the window guidance. Thus, even if the banking sector obtained 
a greater decision making autonomy in its relations with firms, the central bank kept the 
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ability to directly intervene in the banking sector to ensure monetary stability. This approach 
with VAR models allows therefore to investigate the efficiency of sterilization when various 
monetary measures at various times in various intensities have been used (Takagi and Esaka, 
1999). 
We investigate the effects of our indicator on the monetary sector with Granger causality tests 
using the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) and Dolato and Lutkepohl (1996) procedure which 
does not require a cointegration analysis and allow to mix orders of integration processes. 
This procedure is implemented in two steps. First, we determine the maximum order of 
integration (dmax) of the variables in the system and the lag length (k) of a VAR system in 
stationary form. Second, we estimate a VAR in level with p=k+dmax lags. Granger causality 
tests consist to apply standard Wald tests to the first k VAR coefficient matrix.  
We consider several VAR systems. First, we consider two bivariate systems including our 
indicator (NFOA) and broad money (M2) or domestic credit (DC). Secondly, we consider two 
multivariate systems including real NFOA, GDP at constant prices, Chinese real interest rate 
(Chibor 3 month) and real broad money or real domestic credit. Demand money motives are 
taken into account in these systems which allow to check the robustness of the results 
obtained with bivariate systems. Finally, we consider a trivariate system including NFOA, 
broad money and domestic credit in order to take into account interactions between money 
and credit.  
We use the log transformation of index variable (January 1995=100) for all variables except 
Chinese real interest rate. In addition, VAR systems are estimated using monthly data from 
March 1997 to March 200518. Table 2b displays unit roots test results in both level and first 
difference. We conclude that all variables are non-stationary in levels but stationary in first-
differences. Besides the optimal lag order of the VAR system in stationary form is chosen 
                                                
18 The Chinese interest rate is not available before March 1997 in the EcoWin database. 
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considering information criteria and residual statistical properties. We conclude that each 
system needs two lags and we take into account dummies19 to get normality in the residuals.  
As a result, we estimate VAR systems in level with 3 lags and Granger causality is tested with 
restrictions placed on lagged terms up to the second lag. Figure 7 displays the forward 
recursive causality tests from NFOA to M2. On the whole sample, the test support that NFOA 
Granger caused M2 at the 10% level in the three different VAR systems. This outcome is 
recursively confirmed both in the bivariate and in the trivariate system whereas the p-value in 
the multivariate system is up above the 10% level from September to December 2004. We can 
all the same conclude that hot money inflows lead to a monetary expansion and hence reserve 
requirements did not drain all the liquidity. Furthermore, the monetary expansion would have 
been much more considerable without open market operations. These operations were 
therefore the main banks opportunity in order to get out of excess liquidity (Roubini and 
Setser, 2005a).     
On the other hand, Figure 8 shows the results of the forward recursive causality tests from 
NFOA to domestic credit. We conclude at the 10% level that NFOA did not Granger cause 
domestic credit in the three estimated VAR systems. Hence, window guidance curbed credit 
growth and the PBC succeeded in keeping domestic credit under control. 
2.3 Indirect causality tests 
NFOA could all the same have an indirect impact on domestic credit. Figure 9 displays the 
forward recursive causality tests between broad money and domestic credit in the trivariate 
VAR. We conclude that we have a bidirectional causality between these two variables on the 
whole sample although the causality from M2 to DC is not systematically recursively 
confirmed. As a consequence, NFOA does not help to predict DC one period ahead but can 
still cause DC several periods ahead with indirect impacts via M2.  
                                                
19 April 2004 in the bivariate systems; February 1999 and January 2002 in the multivariate systems; December 
1999 and January 2002 in the trivariate system. 
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Such indirect causality is investigated following Dufour et al. (2005). The trivariate VAR 
model written at time 1t is established by: 
3
1 1 1
1
t l t l t
l
W W e ,     0,..., 1t T ,      (9) 
where 1 1 1 1, , 2t t t tW NFOA DC M is a 3x1 random vector, is a 3x1 constant vector 
and the error vector te is such that 0tE e , 0t sE e e if t s and t sE e e if 
t s with det 0 .  
Equation (9) represents a VAR model at horizon one. This model can be expanded to become 
an autoregressive process at horizon h. As suggesting by Dufour et al. (2005), we consider the 
following unrestricted model: 
1 1 2 2
1 2
3 1
1
1 0
h
h h
t h l t l l t h l
l l
W W e ,      0,...,t T h ,    (10) 
where h T  and 0 I . 
The Granger causality is tested at horizon h applying standard Wald tests to the first 2 VAR 
coefficient matrix. Besides, we use the heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation consistent estimator 
developed by Newey and West (1987) to deal with the MA(h-1) error process. The cost of this 
simple procedure is a loss of efficiency since the unrestricted estimated model does not use all 
information.   
The highest horizon we need to examine is h=3 (=1x2+1) according to proposition 4.5 in 
Dufour and Renault (1998): we have only one auxiliary variable (M2), the lag order is two 
and direct causality corresponds to h=1. Table 4 displays indirect causality tests from NFOA 
to domestic credit. These tests support at the 10% level that NFOA Granger causes DC at 
horizon 3 but not at horizon 2. Consequently, window guidance allowed to manage the direct 
impact of hot money inflows on domestic credit but hot money inflows had all the same an 
indirect impact on domestic credit via the loose liquidity conditions underlined by Figure 7.  
 25
2.4 Costs of the sterilization policy 
Several costs resulting from the PBC sterilization policy have been highlighted (Roubini and 
Setser, 2005a-b; Goldstein and Lardy, 2005). First, the PBC used the state-owned banks as 
sterilization bonds buyers. Although these bonds pay more than the 1% associated with excess 
reserves, banks face a profitability issue. Sterilization bonds yield is close to the one on 
deposits and excess reserves result from quantitative constraints on bank lending. 
Consequently, the sterilization policy worsened the banking system weaknesses. Second, 
reserves management did not cause a profitability issue to the PBC insofar as its sterilization 
costs are largely offset by interest income on its reserves portfolio. Nevertheless, the PBC is 
threatened with an exchange rate risk and will face capital losses following an exchange rate 
revaluation. Roubini and Setser (2005a) estimate that a 33% RMB depreciation in 2004 would 
have represented a $150 billion loss which corresponds to 10% of China GDP. The PBC, that 
is taxpayers, is therefore exposed to the potential cost of the current sterilization policy. 
Lastly, sterilization measures can promote additional capital inflows since they limit the 
narrow and broad money expansions and therefore keep the level of domestic interest rates 
high. These additional capital inflows only occur when market participants consider that a 
higher risk premium on domestic assets does not offset these higher interest rates (Takagi and 
Esaka, 1999).  
However, the point is not to blame the partial sterilization applied by the PBC. The credit 
boom would have been bigger without any sterilization intervention and overlending have 
exhibited particular high costs in China in the past. Inflationary pressures would also have 
been stronger without any sterilization intervention. Hence, the partial sterilization policy was 
more suitable than a full sterilization or no sterilization at all to manage costs associated with 
hot money inflows.   
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V. Concluding remarks  
Since the 1987 US stock market crash, the Federal Reserve has been using demand stimuli 
during downturns to flood the financial system with liquidity. Following the dot com
bubble crash, the Federal Reserve kept interest rate lower and longer than in previous cycles. 
These loose monetary conditions led to hot money inflows in China, which boosted economic 
performances, triggered expectations of currency appreciation and finally caused more capital 
inflows.  
Capital controls did not prevent hot money inflows since these controls have become less 
effective over time. However, Chinese authorities were clearly aware of these issues. They 
delayed for a long time the move toward more exchange rate flexibility but they succeeded in 
managing the foreign reserves increase. The estimated VECM shows that the interaction 
between domestic credit and foreign reserves was stable and consistent with monetary 
stability. Moreover, direct and indirect causality tests display that the partial sterilization 
implemented by the PBC allowed to manage the impact of capital inflows on domestic credit.   
However, the sterilization policy was costly and it was not sustainable in the long run for the 
banking sector. 
Consequently, the PBC decided to start a shift in its currency policy. The PBC implemented a 
2.1% revaluation of the RMB (21 July 2005) and linked it to a basket of currencies. This 
managed floating exchange rate suggests that the Chinese demand for dollar-denominated 
asset is likely to be reduced. The instant impact of this turning point was quite small and the 
new exchange rate system is heavily managed the PBC allows a daily trading band of +/- 
3% around the exchange rate announced the day before but it represents the first move 
toward more flexibility. This evolution is the more suitable to temper the excess of the 
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domestic financial system and will enhance the ability of the PBC to tailor money and credit 
conditions to domestics needs (Eichengreen, 2004b).  
Another central issue resulting from this step toward more exchange rate flexibility is to call 
the revived Bretton Woods System (Dooley et al., 2003) into question, i.e. to call into 
question the sustainability of the large US current account deficit. The starting point of this 
paper was the challenging task for the PBC to deal with the international liquidity conditions 
mainly driven by the US monetary policy. We can conclude that the Chinese monetary and 
exchange rate policy could henceforth represent an increasing challenge for US monetary 
policy.   
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Data Appendix 
Data are collected from four sources: Asia Regional Information Center (ARIC) database, 
EcoWin database, Federal Reserve and International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
The monthly series retrieved from the ARIC database are the international reserves (Total 
reserves minus gold), the consumer price index (CPI), the gross domestic product (GDP) and 
the industrial production index (IPI) used in the Chow and Lin (1971) method. The price 
series has been seasonally adjusted by the Census X-12 routine (with multiplicative factors on 
the levels). 
The monthly series retrieved from the EcoWin database are the Chibor 3 month interest rate 
and the Libor 3 month interest rate. 
The monthly series retrieved from the Federal Reserve is the Treasury Bill 3 month constant 
maturity. 
The monthly series retrieved from IFS are the US consumer price index, the real effective 
exchange rate, the domestic credit, the bank s reserves (claims on PBC), the broad money 
(money plus quasi-money), net foreign assets and net other assets in the PBC balance sheet. 
Series from monetary authorities, banking institutions and banking survey are interpolated 
from quarterly data before 1999.  
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Table 1: The balance of payment    
S1-2001 S2-2001 S1-2002 S2-2002 S1-2003 S2-2003 S2-2003* S1-2004
Current Account 5.10 12.31 13.63 21.79 11.12 34.75 34.75 7.47 
Capital Account -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Financial Account 19.00 15.83 12.27 20.07 44.43 8.35 53.35 66.83 
Direct Invesment 18.32 19.04 22.71 24.08 26.92 20.30 20.30 30.48 
Portfolio Investment -10.00 -9.40 -7.00 -3.34 -4.29 15.72 15.72 27.71 
Other Investment 10.68 6.20 -3.44 -0.67 21.79 -27.68 17.32 8.64 
Errors and Omissions -8.50 3.65 5.27 2.52 4.73 13.69 13.69 -7.29 
       
Reserve Assets -15.57 -31.75 -31.15 -44.36 -60.25 -56.77 -101.77 -66.98 
Unit: billion of dollars 
Source: EcoWin database 
* : this column includes the $45 billions used to recapitalize two state commercial banks.    
Table 2: Unit root tests  
a- The VECM model: 1995:03-2005:03   
ADF ADF-GLS PP KPSS 
Level 
1st    
Difference Level 
1st 
Difference Level 
1st 
Difference Level 
1st 
Difference
IR >10% 5% >10% >10% >10% 1% 1% 1% 
DC >10% 1% >10% 1% >10% 1% 1% >10% 
GDP >10% 1% >10% 10% >10% 1% 5% >10% 
*i >10% 1% >10% 1% >10% 1% 1% >10% 
P 5% 1% >10% >10% >10% 1% 10% 1% 
REER >10% 1% >10% 1% >10% 1% 1% >10% 
BR >10% 1% >10% 1% >10% 1% 5% >10% 
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b- VAR systems: 1997:03-2005:03   
ADF ADF-GLS PP KPSS 
 
Level 
1st    
Difference Level 
1st 
Difference Level 
1st 
Difference Level 
1st 
Difference
NFOA >10% 1% >10% 1% >10% 1% 1% >10% 
M2 >10% 1% >10% >10% >10% 1% 1% >10% 
DC >10% 1% >10% 1% >10% 1% >10% >10% 
Chibor >10% 1% >10% >10% >10% 1% 1% >10% 
GDP >10% 1% >10% 1% >10% 1% 1% 1% 
Note: Tables 2a-b report probabilities associated with the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis under the ADF, 
DF-GLS and PP unit root tests is the presence of a unit root whereas the null hypothesis under the KPSS unit 
root test is the stationarity. Lag lengths for the ADF and DF-GLS tests are based on Schwartz information 
criterion. The bandwidth for the PP and KPSS unit root tests are based on the Newey-West estimator using a 
Quadratic spectral kernel (Hobijn, Franses and Ooms, 1998). Unit root tests include a linear time trend and/or a 
constant if they are significant.   
Table 3: VECM estimation    
IR CPI DC GDP *i BR LR test 
1 1 -1 0.1149 -0.1753 0.0079 0.2534 - 
3.62            
( 0.0570 )
1
-0.7435       
[-5.94] 
0.0741        
[ 1.58] 
-0.0201         
[ -0.20] 
0.0162       
[0.99] 
-0.4730         
[ -0.13] - -  -  
2 1 -1 0.1208 -0.1802 0.0090 0.2449 - 
8.35            
( 0.1379 )
2
-0.7694       
[-6.45] 
0                 
[   NA   ]
0                 
[   NA   ]
0                 
[   NA   ]
0                 
[   NA   ] - -  -  
3 1 0.1221 -0.1818 0.0089 0.2461 - 
0.96            
( 0.8086 )
3
-0.8051                      
[-6.69] 
0                 
[   NA   ]
0                 
[   NA   ]
0                 
[   NA   ] - -  -  
4 1 0.1491 -0.2512 0.0079 0.3912 0.0127 
2.84            
( 0.5840 )
4
-0.8825                              
[-7.51] 
0                 
[   NA   ]
0                 
[   NA   ]
0                 
[   NA   ] - 
0                 
[   NA   ] -  
5 1 0.1174 -0.1735 0.0085 0.2298 0 
4.35             
( 0.4998 )
5
-0.9006                              
[-7.43] 
0                 
[   NA   ]
0                 
[   NA   ]
0                 
[   NA   ] - 
0                 
[   NA   ] -  
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Table 4: Indirect causality from NFOA to DC   
h=2 h=3 
Test Statistic Value  df     Probability Value  df     Probability 
F-statistic 0.8955 (2, 82)  0.4123 2.7687 (2, 81)  0.0687 
Chi-square 1.7910 2 0.4084 5.5374 2 0.0627 
Figure 1: Interest rate and China s GIR 
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Note : GIR: Index of Gross International Reserves (January 1997=100) 
Source: ARIC database and EcoWin database  
Figure 2: Recursive Trace test  
a. Forward Trace test 
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b. Backward Trace test 
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Note 1: Trace i: the trace statistic for i cointegrating relation(s) ; Trace ic: the corrected trace statistic for i 
cointegrating relation(s) ; X% CV: the X% critical value. 
Note 2: the backward recursive trace test checks the cointegrating rank constancy in the baseline sample. Figure 
4b has therefore to be read from the right side to the left side. In addition, a constant cointegrating relation 
should display an rising curve insofar as the trace statistic depend on the sample size.   
Figure 3:  recursive estimation  
a- Domestic credit 
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b- GDP 
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c- US interest rate 
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Figure 4: Recursive LR test 
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Figure 5: VECM forecast error impulse responses  
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Note: Confident intervals represent the 95% studentized Hall intervals based on 2000 bootstrap replications and 
50 replications for estimating the variance in each of the outer replication rounds. 
These impulse responses are computed with JMulti 4.02 (Lütkepohl and Krätzig, 2004)    
Figure 6: Year on year variation in the PBC balance sheet 
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Note: MB=NFA+NDA+NOA 
NDA variations are quite small since 2001, so there are not represented on the figure to clarify it.  
Source: IMF IFS database       
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Figure 7: Forward recursive causality test from NFOA to M2 
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Note: H0: NFOA do not Granger cause M2.   
Figure 8: Forward recursive causality test from NFOA to DC 
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Note: H0: NFOA do not Granger cause DC.    
Figure 9: Forward recursive causality test between M2 and DC 
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